

Human appearance: What does not appear in what appears

Stephen Curkpatrick
Sekolah Tinggi Teologi Jemaat Kristus Indonesia
stephencurkpatrick@gmail.com

Abstrak

Pribadi manusia adalah contoh klasik dari penampilan yang membutuhkan dan dimoderasi oleh *apa yang tidak muncul*. Pertanyaan tentang apa yang nyata berkaitan dengan dinamika yang tidak muncul dari apa yang memungkinkan penampakan apa pun. Mengenai hidup manusia, apa yang menjadi pendorong tak terlihat dari kehidupan dan aktivitas jasmani? Ini adalah fokus pada dorongan yang menghidupkan dan memotivasi kehidupan manusia yang biasanya disamakan dengan jiwa, jiwa atau *sang aku* yang unik, yang secara aktif berhubungan dengan orang lain, namun tetap tidak dapat diakses oleh pengamatan mereka, selain dari representasi diri melalui kata-kata, gerak tubuh dan tindakan tubuh. Penampilan di sini bergantung pada ketiadaan yang mendalam yang tanpanya, tidak ada penampilan manusia atau bahkan penampilan apa pun bagi kesadaran manusia. Dengan menggunakan tulisan-tulisan terpilih dari Leibniz, artikel ini memberikan fokus khusus pada konsep jiwa dalam hubungannya dengan dorongan, nafsu dan tujuan dalam penampilan manusia sebagai sosok tubuh yang ekspresif.

Abstract

The human person is a quintessential example of appearance necessitating and moderated by *what does not appear*. The question of what is real concerns non-appearing dynamics of what makes any appearance possible. Concerning human life, what then is the unseen impetus of corporeal life and activity? This is a focus on the animating and motivating impetus of human life that is customarily equated with soul, psyche or the unique *I*, which actively relates to others, yet remains inaccessible to their gaze, apart from self-representation by words, gestures and actions of a body. Appearance is here dependent on a profound non-appearance without which, there are no human appearances or indeed, appearances of anything to human consciousness. Engaging selected writings of Leibniz, this article gives particular focus to the concept of soul in relation to impetus, appetite and purpose in human appearance as an expressive body.

Key words: soul, phenomenology

INTRODUCTION

I appear within life among others with impetus and purpose upsurging as this appearance. This is no different from every other human appearance within life that also likewise appears as if uniquely from nowhere. Each is differentiated as singular, yet each having such a similar body, that a stable albeit developing science

can calculate its healthy function, while no science can establish direct access to the thoughts, motivations, intentions and purpose of a soul or the animating *I*. So what is a human being in its primary appearance in the midst of life? What is real in this appearance? What remains hidden in this appearing? What principle makes appearance possible?

The human person is a quintessential example of appearance necessitating and moderated by what does not appear. What is real concerns a non-appearing impetus that makes any appearance possible. Positing this impetus does not diminish what appears—a corporeal body amid life among others and things; it does imply, however, that there is more to appearance than what appears. Accordingly, this is a focus on the animating impetus of human life, which is equated with soul, psyche or the unique *I* that is present with, relates to, and is active among others. This animating impetus is inaccessible to the gaze of others, apart from what is represented by each in words, gestures and activities expressed through a body. Appearance is dependent on profound non-appearance without which, there are no human appearances or indeed, appearances of anything to human consciousness.

In terms of method, this article gives particular focus to selected writings of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), with synthesis and interpretation of Leibniz's views on soul, force, appetite, causality and intelligence in relation to human appearance as corporeal, with its sufficient reasons for functioning as a body. First, then, Leibniz's distinction between two causalities, *efficient* and *final*, as a distinction between apparent and non-apparent causalities are introduced; second, *primary force* is explicated as a source of impetus for what appears, without appearing, as being equated with the intelligent purpose of a soul; third, Leibniz's representation of corporeal existence is explored for its direct implications within human identity as appearing, yet without appearing; fourth, questions and trajectories are raised in regard to human mortality and endurance of the soul or *I* of human existence.¹

1. BETWEEN EFFICIENT AND FINAL CAUSALITIES

What appears in human being? A public body, the nature of which can be ascertained through different analytical prisms of social and scientific disciplines, as if seen variously by many; a singular animated appearance amid life emerging from an unseen source and unity, as if windowless to any extrinsic gaze. Within this contrast, what is human identity as an animated unity and purposeful orientation between two causalities, *efficient* and *final*?²

Two different causalities—one, of cause-and-effect ratios, so Leibniz's *efficient* causality, and the other, purpose or Leibniz's *final* causality. Within efficient causality, physical life interacts with an extrinsic environment of influences, stimulations and irritations, so responses of attraction and reaction according to external effects on physical existence; the body functions predictably within variegated layers of efficient causality, stable and automatic, as a whole living organism. The other causality, with which body is inscribed with impetus as final causality is qualified by valuations; this impetus by way of purpose, upsurges as appetite, so aspiration and desire, with consequent effects from this purposeful unity of consciousness or the *I*.³ Leibniz refers to the *I* as an indivisible *monad* or unity, the soul, mind or psyche animating a person out of perceptions of existence,

mirrored and represented within a perspective of life; each self or soul has a sense of what life is and therefore represents and regulates its relation to this accordingly.⁴ Dynamic interaction between mind and body is assumed; representations of self in relation to life occur out of perception and so perspective; active engagement with extrinsic influences is mediated through these representations, even as the body as a complex organism, in the absence of dysfunction, functions with seamless effectiveness within efficient causality.⁵

The soul is a singular unity (*monas*) so monad that animates and coordinates a body consisting of numerous subsidiary monads.⁶ This coordination occurs out of perceptions and representations of an entire human person—with the soul, self or consciousness as an animating centre, orientated by purpose and appetitions that seek to fulfil qualitative attractions and anticipations. While efficient causes operate with numerous predictable cause-and-effect ratios operating within a body, conscious orientation toward an end or purpose exhibits degrees of intensity and clarity according to perceptions and perspective. Humans are distinguished from animals by self-reflective consciousness that moderates intention, purpose and appetite. While the body is predictably hungry and nourished by food, the human soul is appetitive and sustained according to its perceptions, perspective and representation of purpose or end value, moderating its relation to extrinsic life, which includes others.⁷

For Leibniz, then, a human being exhibits two different causalities, *efficient* and *final*, giving predictable function and appetitive purpose, the latter upsurging from the unifying monad or *I*, with a composite cohesive body animated and coordinated from a conscious self. A tension between apparent and actual within human existence is reflected in these two causalities. Bodily presence and existence are palpably obvious; appearance and activity are variously calibrated within social and scientific disciplines. Purpose and appetite—generated from the *I*, the soul animating a body—are not so obvious as to source and orientation, even if these are represented by thoughts and words expressed through activities of the body. This is a general sketch of Leibniz's ontology, here primarily related to human life.⁸

2. BETWEEN FORCE AND PHENOMENA

Life is inseparable from non-appearance that animates what appears. Laws of nature, which have been gleaned through experience and observation, are for Leibniz, not sufficient to account for the unity-with-impetus of what appears corporally amid extensive matter that is infinitely divisible, but rather, appearance necessitates a non-appearing concept of *force* to account for its unity and impetus. This force is animated with appetite, so equated with our sense of *soul* or what Aristotle referred to as a *first entelechy*—for Leibniz, *primary force* with active purpose.⁹ Soul as a unique *I*, reflects in its activity, the image of God, while corporality conforms to specific composition, even as its activities are volitional as intelligently motivated. This is a metaphysical proposal that surpasses empirical observation; our capacity for thinking, aspiration, purposeful intention and actions toward an end that holds personal value, exhibits the difference between *primary force* as soul or intelligent agency, and, corporality that is accounted for by sufficient reasons as to functional cause and effect.¹⁰ What appears in terms of distinctive human existence amid natural phenomena is related to what does not

appear in terms of metaphysical perspective in which each soul is unique, having its origin and end in God.¹¹

Intelligent soul reflects the image of God; uniquely, each is creative after God's creativity, organising life within its realm with synthesising impetus, discovery and inventive endeavour; while the stage on which each soul acts creatively is an infinitely smaller realm, each nevertheless acts with requisite creativity in imitation of God's creativity.¹² Soul or essential *I*, for Leibniz, reflects the whole of existence, albeit confusedly, as if having a general intuition of existence, but without distinctive knowledge of existence in its complexity and entirety.¹³ If we could see every perception in a soul, we would see a reflection of the universe, for each soul (monad) consists of infinite perceptions, too numerous to be apperceived in conscious awareness. Each monad represents while being regulated by the best within its perceptions; the degree of clear perceptions is also its degree of perfection or completeness.¹⁴ If Leibniz's soul reflects and is creative after the reality of God, the human person is premised on this reality; human appearance occurs within the impetus of metaphysical reality, with the same principle of non-appearance that is necessary to appearances of any kind.

A body is animated and coordinated by purposive activity and orientation (*entelechy*) of each soul or *I* (*monad*), while consisting of many monads that are dynamic in subordinate functions related to a whole organism.¹⁵ Bodies, for Leibniz, represent dynamic compositions consisting of numerous minute monads of intelligence or orienting information that appear as a certain physical bulk, as phenomena that are commonly perceived.¹⁶ This is Leibniz's *well-founded* appearance of phenomena—as composite unities of simple substances, the appetite or impetus of each, subordinate within and contributing to the unity of a whole body as a phenomenon—after a rainbow's appearance to intelligence as a congruent phenomenon of numerous entities of light and water.¹⁷ Corporeal bodies, then, consist of dynamic intelligent substances, monads, with varying degrees of impetus and activity as composite organisms that are well-founded as naturally appearing phenomena.

3. METAPHYSICS AND APPEARANCES

In Leibniz's metaphysics, soul as a primary substance or monad, is related to *final cause*—God; yet soul interacts with efficient causality within bodies, even as each soul represents this world of efficient causality from itself. While the soul has intrinsic impetus and spontaneity, it interfaces in seeming natural conformity with an extrinsic world of cause and effect, which it represents from a particular perspective—therefore, not things in themselves but phenomena, appearances, generated out of perceptions as representations, independent of these, as if paradoxically, the soul relates only to God, yet in agreement with extrinsic things so represented.¹⁸ Phenomena agree with the monadic *I* because phenomena are represented by the monadic *I*; the effect of such perception and representation is a near seamless sense of interaction by self as soul in its appetitions and purpose with life that appears naturally as *the way it is*. While extrinsic life functions with a certain predictability within its efficient causality, every *I* freely represents life from a unique perspective, effectively diversifying the universe relative to perspective.¹⁹ For Leibniz, this is a reasonable supposition if the body is animated by intelligence

that relates primarily to God. Inversely, it would be difficult to accept Leibniz's metaphysics in the absence of his supposition that soul—the unique *I*—has its source in God, in representing its corporality uniquely within life. Leibniz's commitment to posing and responding to the question of *why there something rather than nothing*—is orientated to metaphysics in which there is something that appears precisely because of what does not appear.²⁰ An assertion that *what appears is all there is*, is an empirical response to life. If *what appears is, only because of what does not appear*, this is a metaphysical response. Empirical and metaphysical responses to life certainly account for differences in human perspectives of reality.²¹

From the inter-relation of efficient and final causality, there is, invariably, differentiation between numerous material cause-and-effect ratios, and, final cause, which is otherwise than materially regulated. Final cause is mediated by perceptions, perspective and representations of soul or psyche in purpose, aspiration or desire for a particular end that qualifies and motives toward what is perceived to be good or the best. Such causality is not material, yet it is as effective in motivating modification and change within the appetitive *I* or soul, as material causality is in impacting a physical body.²² Which causality assumes priority within human existence? Leibniz gives priority to metaphysics—to the soul or *I* that unifies, animates and coordinates a physical organism of numerous inter-related monads or substances in one body. The first is a unity; the latter, as a composite organism, can be fragmented—so the difference between health and dysfunction—to the degree that there is demise and finally, termination of a functional body. As an organism, a body exhibits a common form of corporeal expression; therefore, medical science can ascertain many causal factors for general bodily health. The body is an efficient causal system with enough sufficient reasons as to be predictable, even if all reasons and explanations $n+1$ are not known. My body, however, is represented uniquely by me as myself, even if it has a similar appearance to numerous other bodies, for by virtue of its metaphysical source, *I appear* only by self-representation of what appears.

4. DEMISE AND DURATION

While demise of human corporality occurs, with the body finally dissipated elementally into other forms, for Leibniz, the source of human animation, activity and purpose endures. As the source of impetus and activity toward an end purpose, each soul represents a site of valuated endeavour that is preserved beyond the body's demise.²³ The soul as an indivisible unity is indestructible, unlike the body that is constituted of numerous minute substances, which can participate in different material formations.²⁴ This is an expression of Leibniz's perspective of human existence as sourced and motivated metaphysically—toward an intelligible end that does not appear in human appearance, while being wholly present to human aspiration and purpose that animates a body.²⁵ While a person appears corporally as a living body, animated activity is invoked by immaterial force, impetus or soul—with purpose, aspiration to completeness and so valuations beyond the material components of human physicality, beyond also what physicality can generate—as animated by and aspiring to nothing less than the universal goodness of God.²⁶

Human intelligence and its aspirational impetuses toward purpose and goodness as a sense of completion are qualitatively different than corporality.²⁷ Physical

functions occur rhythmically, automatically (breathing, heart beating, eating and digestion within the recurrent need for nourishment); animation as to aspiration, purpose and end upsurge beyond anything physicality can generate, so that intelligent soul or entelechy appears, without appearing, in activities of the body. The demise of a body does not terminate its animating source, soul; its source is God, the source of purpose and aspiration toward a qualitative end. Accordingly, monads—whether represented by an *I*, or, as minutely permeating organisms—endure, while an organic body as a specific composition eventually disintegrates. This source of self-identity as the unity of its activity, the conscious *I*, apperceives what others might attempt to peer into. Leibniz’s monads represent imperviousness. While materiality is divisible into numerous parts, souls or monads by contrast, represent unity, the unique *I*, mirroring divine unity, qualitatively, beyond material composition as an aggregate of divisible materiality.²⁸ Because it has its source in God as also the focus of its final causality, the soul is independent of all other things.²⁹

Soul is the primary animating unity of a human body, a coordinating monad, the *I*, while numerous inter-related monads, each consisting of further monads, animate and inform diverse parts of the body. Bodies consist of divisible matter, but each part of a body, however small, consists in the animated functioning unity of minute monads.³⁰ Since the *I* or soul is a monad that has its source and end in God, it endures beyond the demise of a once appearing body, which through numerous cooperating monads, indirectly, also had its source in God. This is a metaphysical thesis premised on acceptance of the creative reality God as source and end of the human soul—what I call *me*—which appears in life, is known among others, yet does not *appear*, as hidden and only known in the reality of God.

CONCLUSION

Certain presuppositions are requisite for accepting Leibniz’s thought as to the substantial identity and durability of monads appearing, yet not appearing. Bodies appear substantively as *well-founded* phenomena, yet the substantive appearance of bodies depends on a principle of unity-with-impetus that does not appear—at least not directly—the unity of *soul*, an intelligent, perspectival, animating, appetitive monad that is equated with *me*, appearing in its essence to no one but God as the premise for a corporeal body that appears in the midst of life among others. A purely material premise for all that appears corporally as human existence may be proffered variously through different scientific and sociological disciplines, yet the issue of something more to *me* than corporeal appearance and its material and social analysis is always stubbornly present within human existence. Leibniz speaks to this through a philosophical vocabulary that suggests intelligent engagement with metaphysical possibilities concerning the appearance of humans—a non-appearance of its source of appearing as an animated person with qualitative purpose and values within life.

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¹ The primary writings engaged within this article are: Leibniz, "A New System of the Nature and Communication of Substances, and of the Union of the Soul and Body", "On Nature Itself, Or, on the Inherent Force and Actions of Created things, Toward Confirming and Illustrating Their dynamics", "Discourse on Metaphysics", "The Principles of Philosophy or, the Monadology", "Principles of Nature and Grace", referenced as "New System", "On Nature", "Discourse", "Monadology", "Principles" respectively, along with correspondence, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, trans. & ed. Roger Ariew & Daniel Garber (Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989). Major works reflected in the summary writings: Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, Abridged edition, trans. & ed. Peter Remnant & Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 2009) referenced as *New Essays*; Leibniz, *Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil*, trans. E.M. Huggard, ed. & intro. Austin Farrer (Delhi: Lector House, 2019), referenced as *Theodicy*. For specific engagement with Leibniz's "Monadology", Anthony Savile, *Leibniz and the Monadology* (London & New York: Routledge, 2000); Nicholas Rescher, *G.W. Leibniz's Monadology* (London & New York: Routledge, 1991, 2013); Lloyd Strickland, *Leibniz's Monadology: A New Translation and Guide* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014). For extensive engagement with Leibniz's thought, Nicholas Jolley, ed. *Cambridge Companion to Leibniz* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). On Leibniz's occasional writings as engaging a wide range of historical philosophical issues,

Richard T.W. Arthur, *Leibniz* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014). For succinct engagement with several issues within Leibniz' thought, Nicholas Jolley, *Leibniz*. 2nd edition (London & New York: Routledge, 2020).

² The following paragraphs reflect foci of: "Principles", §§ 1-4; "Discourse", §§ 21-22; "Monadology", §§ 79, 87; "On Nature", §§ 11, 12; "Letters to Johann Bernoulli", *Philosophical Essays*, 167-171; *New Essays*, I.i.

³ Leibniz refers to "self, substance, soul, mind" together. (§ 5) Appetition in orientation to a final cause makes explicable what cannot be ascertained in efficient causality, so appealing to wisdom and apposite purpose instead of necessity. (§§ 3, 11) "Principles", §§ 3, 5, 11.

⁴ "Monadology", §§ 1-11; "Principles", §§ 1-4, 12-14. The monadic *I* is the necessary unity of a composite body. "Letters to Johann Bernoulli", 167. "Letters to de Volder", *Philosophical Essays*, 177. Some monads are purposive but not apperceptive (self-aware); all monads give cohesion to bodies as phenomena. "Letter to Samuel Masson, On Body", *Philosophical Essays*, 225, 227-228.

⁵ Internal representation of extrinsic phenomena is varied according to *clear* or *confused* perceptions; there are varying degrees of *distinctive* and *suppositive* knowledge. "Discourse", § 24. Assumption of mind or soul interacting with the body correlates with Leibniz's concept of *pre-established harmony*. "Principles", §§ 3, 15; "Monadology", §§ 78-79, 83, 87; "New System", 143-144; *New Essays*, II.xiv.11; "Letters to Clarke", II.8, IV.31, *Philosophical Essays*; "Postscript of a Letter to Basnage de Beauval", *Philosophical Essays*, 147-148; *Theodicy*, §§ Pref., 62.

⁶ "Monadology", §§ 1-3, 8; "Principles", § 12; "Letters to de Volder", 176; "Letters to Johann Bernoulli", 167; "Leibniz to Nicole Remond: Appendix on Monads", Strickland, *Leibniz's Monadology*, 278. Monads are most like minds, yet with degrees of self-reflexive consciousness—so *clear* and *confused* perceptions and representations.

⁷ Human distinction from animals is marked by intelligence for reflection, abstraction and a capacity to think causality. "Principles", § 5; "Monadology", §§ 29-30.

⁸ Any active entity has a *determining principle*, which is only expressed through corporality—so animation, organisation, change, unity and unique expression that is given impetus by God, so Leibniz's ontology is also metaphysics. God as primary substance is the source of derivative effects by agency of reason within existence in its continuing expression; if imperfect, this is due to ontological limits. "Principles", §§ 8-9. On the animation of all existence, "Monadology", §§ 64-69; *New Essays*, I.i; "To Nicole Remond", 278-279.

⁹ On *first entelechy*, *primary motive force* as also *soul* or *monad*, so a necessary impetus inscribed in material bodies. "On Nature", §§ 11-13; "Monadology", §§ 62-63, 70; "New System", 139; "Letters to Johann Bernoulli", 168-169. Primitive or primary force is equated with "internal strivings" in distinction from "derivative forces" of phenomena. "Letters to de Volder", 181. Force or impetus is given to nature to function inherently, efficiently, effectively and spontaneously as nature; this is also the principle of body-soul unity. "On Nature", §§ 2-4, 6-10. Corporeal entities have unity through a principle of unity or soul as also an aggregate of numerous similar entities and unities. "From the Letters to Thomas Burnett ...", *Philosophical Essays*, 289. On *entelechy*, also see "Monadology", §§ 18, 19, 48; "Principles", §§ 3-4.

¹⁰ Metaphysics rather than physics gives the principle of sufficient reason for *what is* and *why* this occurs—with the primary question of metaphysics posed to be answered: "*Why is there something rather than nothing?*" and further to this, why things "exist just as they do". (§ 7) Sufficient reason for *what is* cannot be discovered in matter, corporality, or even the

representing soul; matter is passive and indifferent to impetus; sufficient reason is extrinsic to any series of cause-and-effect. (§ 8) God is the sufficient as ultimate reason for *what is*. “Principles”, §§ 7-8; “Monadology”, §§ 36-38, 79, 87; “Discourse”, §§ 19-22; “On the Ultimate Origination of Things”, *Philosophical Essays*, 150, 151-152. Corporality is distinguished from matter by a principle of unity, soul, beyond mere aggregation of materiality. “From the Letters to Thomas Burnett ... *Draft*”, 289; thinking and intelligence are otherwise than materiality. “Letter to Lady Masham, On Thinking Matter”, *Philosophical Essays*, 290. Metaphysics concerns a reality that is distinct, yet does not imply absence from the world. “Letters to Arnauld”, *Philosophical Essays*, 82-83; “Letters to de Volder”, 172-176; “Letters to Clarke”, § III.15.

¹¹ “New System”, 139-140. “Discourse”, §§ 9-10, 18, 30. God is not a *world-soul*; there is no parallel between God–world and soul–body, which would amount to an identification of God with the world. Leibniz, “Letters to Clarke”, §§ IV.29-30, 33-34; similarly, “On Nature”, §§ 2, 8.

¹² “Principles”, § 14; “Discourse”, § 9, 33. *Endeavour* is equated with the active force of entelechy, and wherever with perception, entelechy is also soul. *New Essays*, II.xxi.1, 4, xxii.11. Leibniz’s principle of the *identity of indiscernibles* implies that every existing thing is unique. “Letters to Clarke”, §§ IV.4-6.

¹³ “Principles”, § 12; “Discourse”, § 9. Differences between *clear* and *distinct* knowledge are elaborated in “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas”, *Philosophical Essays*, 23-27.

¹⁴ “Principles”, §§ 12-14.

¹⁵ “Monadology”, § 63.

¹⁶ “Monadology”, §§ 66-71; “Letters to de Volder”, 179-182. “Letters to Arnauld”, 85-88.

¹⁷ “Letters to de Volder”, 177-182; “Primary Truths”, *Philosophical Essays*, 34; “Note on Foucher’s Objections”, *Philosophical Essays*, 147; “To Nicole Remond”, 278-279. An aggregate, such as a rainbow, has a real unity but is also “phenomenal” in appearing to intelligence. “Conversations of Philarète and Ariste”, *Philosophical Essays*, 262-263; materiality is infinitely divisible and knowledge extends beyond appearance. *New Essays*, II.xii.6, xxiii.12.

¹⁸ “New System”, 143-144; “Discourse”, § 32.

¹⁹ “Letters to de Volder”, 177.

²⁰ For Leibniz’s question, *Why is there something rather than not nothing?* “Principles”, § 7. See note 10 above.

²¹ On a general response of “I-know-not-what” to what the undergirding reality of existence is. “From the Letters to Thomas Burnett”, 286.

²² “Discourse”, §§ 12, 19, 30; “Letters to de Volder”, 173-174.

²³ Because *elemental materiality* is inherently divisible, having no perception, self-reflection and therefore responsible disposition, it perishes. The *I* is different, having metaphysical impetus that is imperishable—as continuity of memory, knowledge and ethical responsibility—enduring as apperceptively intelligent. “Discourse”, § 34. Death for dominant or coordinating monads is akin to sleep from which they will awake. “Principles”, §§ 6, 12. Leibniz relates morality to immortality. *New Essays*, II.xxi.37, 54, 70. Human *immortality*, which includes personality and morality, is distinguished from the *imperishability* of monads, which constitute the unity-with-impetus of all living things. *Theodicy*, § 89.

²⁴ This is suggested implicitly by Leibniz. “Discourse”, § 32. Monad or soul is non-perishable because non-divisible; yet with the dissolution of corporeal entities, the status of coordinating monads retains some latent relation to *diminished* corporality, though how is unclear; the

prevailing sense of monadic imperishability is that there is neither *nothing dead nor disembodied* in a universe of numerous interrelated living things in *perpetual flux*, the universe having its source and continuing existence in God, requisite to efficient and final causalities. “Monadology”, §§ 4-6, 20-21, 62-66, 69, 71-73, 77-80, 83, 87; *Theodicy*, §§ 90, 403.

²⁵ “New System”, 140; *New Essays*, II.i.12, ix.14, xxi.37, 54, IV.xvi.12; “Discourse”, § 19.

²⁶ “Principles”, §§ 13, 18; “Monadology”, §§ 53-55, 84-86; *Theodicy*, §§ 8, 78.

²⁷ “New System”, 140-141.

²⁸ “New System”, 141-142; *New Essays*, IV.iii.6.

²⁹ “New System”, 144-145.

³⁰ With the loss of a coordinating *I* from the body in death, subsequent dissolution of a particular monadically suffused organism occurs. These minute monads do not die; the implication is that they become part of other corporeal entities. Leibniz makes this suggestion but also rejects any transference of the soul to another entity. “Letters to Johann Bernoulli”, 169-170; “Letters to Arnauld”, 88; “Monadology”, § 72.